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1. Introduction
Corals and their associated ecosystems are of great ecological and economic importance to
Caribbean island nations and must be protected. Despite the Aichi target 111 that stipulated that by 2020
each country should have 10% of its maritime area devoted to protected areas, Marine protected areas
(MPAs), both within the Caribbean and elsewhere, are all affected by the lack of funding to carry out
conservation activities and enhancement of the existing ecological heritage. MPA funding takes on
essentially four forms: (1) funding of state public funds or from local authorities, (2) self-financing, based
on revenues generated by the sale of fees for entrance, activities and various services, (3) public-private
partnership, achieved particularly with environmental foundations of large industrial groups and (4)
research and development projects, which provide support to MPAs in a timely manner, and even more
frequently when incurred by activities of research or ecological monitoring. The future Regional Nature
Reserve (RNR) of “le Prêcheur”, located in the North-West of Martinique (see map below) must, as of
today, include the financing of daily operations and investments on the agenda of priority actions. In
addition to the financial support granted from the region, additional income modes should be considered.
The main objective of this article is to highlight the various possible additional funding
sources for the sustainable functioning of the MPA of le Prêcheur. Several feasibility
assessments of the implementation of funding of MPA mechanisms exist but each of them focus
on a specific type of financing and its related feasibility, usually based on the willingness to pay
(Reid-Grant and Bhat, 2009; Chen et al., 2014; Thur, 2010), while the contribution of this article
is to present all possible options for complementary funding of MPAs and evaluate their
feasibility in the context of Martinique. The options of taxes, royalties and entry fees that can be
used to partially finance the future RNR of le Prêcheur are developed according to criteria of
general framework for tax implementation and regimes. Of these options, only those that appear
achievable are retained and their feasibility is analysed in more detail. This further analysis of
the feasibility allows us to rank the options and thus evaluate which one to keep. The article also
introduces the concept of “payment for ecosystem services” (PES) which, in the context of the
RNR of le Prêcheur, could be used to compensate fishermen for their efforts towards the
improvement of environmental services of the MPA of le Prêcheur (Failler, 2016). PES are not
used directly to finance the operation of the reserve, but to compensate fishermen for their
efforts towards the improvement of ecosystem services of MPAs, which compensates for the
reduction of fishing activity while involving fishermen in the process of habitat conservation and
sustainable use of fisheries resources.
The paper is structured in 3 parts. It starts by presenting an inventory of the volume and sources
of public funding for natural areas in the French metropolitan area and in the French overseas
territories. It then provides an analysis of main potential sources of income through the assessment of
current options. It follows with a presentation of other funding options for which investigative work
is required. Finally, the concept of payment for environmental services, and it applicability in the
functioning of the RNR of le Prêcheur, is analysed. A conclusion gives the summary of key findings
and some research and policy orientations.
1 See: https://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/rationale/target-11/.
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Map 1. Martinique island and “Le Prêcheur” location on the North-West of the island.
(source: http://www.geographicguide.com/america-maps/martinique.htm).
2. Public financing and taxation of French natural areas
The current system of public budget allocated to the protection of French natural areas in the
mainland and French overseas aims to improve the quality of sites, landscapes, natural environments,
as well safeguarding natural habitats. It also aims, when health status and vulnerability of natural
areas allows it, to be used for spatial planning towards the opening to the people.
2.1. Public financing in favour of protected natural areas
According to the French Environmental Code, which applies in Martinique, protection and
financing of protected natural areas is a shared jurisdiction between state and local authorities. The
French protected natural areas are therefore currently funded almost exclusively by the public sector.
Private funding through foundations and corporate sponsorship, is more uncommon, while self-financing
from private operating revenue remains marginal.
State public financing assigned to protect the French marine and coastal environments are
estimated at €74 million (see Table 1). These, however, are largely underestimated: State grants are
supplemented by the budgets earmarked to policies in favour of environment conservation by local
authorities (at nearly four times the state budget).
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Table 1. State public budget (and operating organizations) for the protection of marine and
coastal ecosystems.
Level Budget (million €) Notes
State 28.1 Allocated budget, program 113 action 7*
French Marine Protected
Areas Agency
1 -
French Coastal Protection
Agency
40 €2.4 million of which come from repayments of the
state and €37.6 million come from an individual
taxation regime
Other operators 5 -
Total State + operators 74.1 In comparison, the total state budget allocated to the
conservation of natural areas and water management
amounts to €2447 million
Source: Translated from Badré M and Duranthon JP, 2010. *Current financial resources allocated by the state
to the budget for biodiversity policies are partly addressed by action 7 “management of environments and
biodiversity” program 113 of the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and the Sea.
2.2. Taxes and royalties related to exploitation or use of natural areas
The state gets almost all of its income from compulsory levies (taxes, royalties, etc.). Those of
regional authorities come from the state repayments or are induced by the individual tax system (e.g.,
the development tax, for which part of it is allocated to natural areas). The Environmental Code
acknowledging the “polluter-payer” principle, taxation of the environment uses taxes and royalties to
prevent or punish damaging behaviour to natural areas. Tax revenues are intended to pay for public
services provided by the state or “collectivities” (local authorities). The revenues of royalties are
used to pay for the services provided by private supplier or by common pool resources (here marine
ecosystems) for a service provided to users. However, as some royalties work as eco-taxes, the
distinction between both payments does not always fit to this definition (see Box 1).
The French law identifies three principles of taxation of natural areas, which meet three
distinct objectives:
a. To compensate exploitation of natural resources
b. To compensate disturbances and damages to ecosystems
c. To compensate use of the marine area
To get a better outlook of their relative relevance, the overview of taxes and royalties
related to the use and exploitation of natural resources is structured below based on the amount
of income they generate.
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Box 1. Taxes versus royalties. Source: Extract from the final report of the Operational
Committee nº5, Grenelle of the Sea.
The tax is levied from the provision of a service. It may be required not only from actual users but also from
potential users and the amount is not strictly equivalent to the service provided (e.g. tax for household waste
collection). The tax is provided by the law.
Royalties (or remuneration) for services rendered are received in return for a service, such as the use of a piece of
work or a benefit provided by a public service to a user while bearing the cost, and therefore must match the value
of the benefit or service. A royalty can be established through regulation. The amount of the royalty must be
equivalent to the value of the benefit or proportional to the cost of the service rendered. Such is the case of the
“institution of a royalty comprising of a fixed part and a variable part, provided that the calculation of the fee allows
to ensure the proportionality with the cost of the service rendered” (EC No. 220803 of July 9 2009). ‘Respect for
the rule of equivalence between the fare of a royalty and the value of the benefit or service can be ensured by
withholding the cost of the latter, but also according to the characteristics of the service, by taking into account the
economic value of the benefit to the recipient; that in all cases, the fare must be established according to objective
and rational criteria, in full conformity with the principle of equality between the users of public services and the
competition rules (ECNo 309 499 of 7 October 2009) .
Environmental royalties can be defined as payment for environmental services: in return for their payment, the
taxpayer receives an environmental service. As pollution could be interpreted as a particular use of a natural
resource (right to pollute), a levy associated with a degradation of the environment can then be likened to a royalty.
The distinction between taxes and royalties is also based on the allocation of revenues. Into the general budget for
the first case, revenues are earmarked for specific purposes in the case of royalties. Yet, in the field of
environmental taxation, these two aspects of distinction between taxes and royalties are not systematically
combined. This explains why these two terms are sometimes interchangeably used.
2.2.1. Royalties for the use or consumption of water resource
The majority of tax revenues related to natural areas are dependent on water management policies:
more than nine tenths of the budget and total tax resources for natural areas originate from royalties and
charges levied by the National Office for Water and Aquatic Environments (ONEMA) and water
agencies and offices, representing €1.9 billion according to Badré and Duranthon (2010). In comparison,
the marine environment, and to a lesser extent, terrestrial biodiversity, appear as the poor relation.
The Water Office of Martinique, as well as other water agencies, collects a number of royalties
for the use or consumption of water resources, which are devoted to actions to promote a better use
of water in the territory2.
2.2.2. Royalties for occupation or use of public ground
The state also draws royalties from the occupation or use of public ground. In the maritime area,
this includes for example fishing and hunting rights, the product of exploitation of marine cultures,
2 See Article L213-10 of the Environment Code.
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products of extractions, rights of way for operators of telecommunication networks. The income
amounted to almost €300 million in 2010.
2.2.3. Land planning tax
At the scale of local authorities, tax measures to raise funds in favour of protected natural areas
mainly belong to the departments, through the development tax. Formerly Departmental Tax on Sensitive
Natural Areas (TDENS), it is primarily intended to generate resources to finance actions in favour of
biodiversity. Governed by the Urban Planning Code, it subdues the construction, reconstruction,
expansion of buildings and other facilities projects subject to licence or declaration. Optional, it has
nevertheless enabled significant financial reserve estimated at €269 million in 2010 (République
Française, 2011). This net balance is due to under-utilization and a recurring postponement of a year on
year revenue from this tax. Its rate varies according to the department, but it cannot exceed 2% of the
value of the housing complexes. In 2009, of the 95 metropolitan departments and 4 overseas departments,
nine departments had not implemented the TDENS, 20 had introduced a rate of 2%, 16 a rate between 1
and 2%, 34 a 1% rate, and 21 a rate lower than 1%. Among the charted expenditures, the TDNES is used
mainly for the development and maintenance of sensitive natural areas—the rest is devoted to the
acquisition of these areas or is donated to another collectivity.
2.2.4. Visitor’s tax
Some taxes are not directly associated to natural areas but their employment is linked through
tourism depending on them. For municipalities and groups of collectivities with their individual tax, the
visitor’s tax3 is usually applied to expenses dedicated to promoting tourist visitation of the territory.
However, some municipalities have instituted this tax for actions of protection and management of their
natural areas, the revenue from the tax can be allocated4, to expenses to promote the protection and
management of their natural areas for tourism purposes. The law provides that when these municipalities
are situated in whole or in part on the territory of a national park or a regional park administered by a
public administrative establishment, the product of the visitor’s tax can be donated by the municipality or
public establishment of inter-municipal cooperation to the park management organization as part of a
convention. The visitor’s tax has yielded €158 million for municipalities and €45 million for groups of
collectivities of individual tax in 2010.
2.2.5. Other taxes
Other taxes on exploitation or use of natural areas exist, although they are less substantial. They
are assigned to other legal entities then the state. In the area of environmental protection, those who
have yielded the highest average tax revenue in 2010 (French Republic, 2011) are:
3 See Article L2333 - 26-46 of the General Code of territorial collectivities.
4 Subject to the provisions of Article L. 2231-14.
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a. The general tax on polluting activities TAGP5 for €489 million, part of which benefits the ADEME;
b. The levy on the product of premiums or additional contributions relating to the guarantee against
natural disasters risk (€158 million) intended for the Prevention of major natural disasters
fund (FPRNM);
c. The hunting royalties that benefit primarily the National Agency for Hunting and Wildlife
(€70 million);
d. The right to francization and navigation that benefits the Coastal and Lake Shore Conservation
Authority in particular (€39 million);
Finally, some taxes reflect the compensation for inconvenience generated by the transport of
passengers but generate far less income. For example, the tax on passengers departing to natural
protected areas6 generated less than €1 million in revenue in 2010, revenue that shared the
Conservatoire du Littoral, the marine park of Port-Cros, the National Forestry Office, affected
collectivities, etc. For overseas territorial collectivities specifically, the tax due by air and maritime
public transport companies on passengers (Article 285 ter of the Customs Code) is dedicated to
classified or listed natural areas, national parks, natural reserves, CELRL sites or ports exclusively or
mainly one of the protected areas mentioned above without being included. In 2010, Martinique,
Guadeloupe, Guyana and Reunion have drawn together €8 million.
3. Usefulness and limitations of a tax as additional financing of the future RNR of le Prêcheur
RNRs are under the competence of the Region. From the ranking to the implementation of the
management plan and organization of events, the Region therefore supports technically and
financially the owner or organization managing the protected natural area (or in process of being
ranked). According to the provisions prescribed by the regulations for intervention, it can subsidise a
part of the operating and investment expenditures (actions of restoration, preservation and
enhancement)—never all of the expenditures.
The region exclusively uses its budget, supplemented by the state, to finance the management of
RNRs (unlike for example Departments that have the ability to use the revenues from the
development tax). The use of taxation to complement the funding of the RNR of le Prêcheur includes
the study of obstacles and opportunities for the establishment of such a design, as well as the
definition of the base, geography or rate.
3.1. Different options to implement taxes as partial financing
Options for the implementation of one (or more) tax(es) to partially finance the RNR of le
Prêcheur fit into three distinct approaches:
a. The introduction of a new tax/royalty;
b. The assignment of an existing tax in whole or in part to the financing of the reserve;
5Article 266 of the Customs Code.
6Article 285 quater of the Customs Code.
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c. Broadening the rate of an existing tax to include the financing of the reserve. These three approaches
set the general framework of the tax implementation. For each approach, it is possible to consider
various regimes of taxes and royalties, in terms of:
d. The subjected population: involved populations may include residential tourists, users of marine
ecosystems, companies that pollute or have a negative impact on marine ecosystems;
e. The geographical scale: the intervention scale of the tax may be local and limited to the municipality of
le Prêcheur (and potentially the neighbouring municipalities of Saint-Pierre and Trois-Rivières; see
map 1 above) or regional and extended to the whole of Martinique. In the first case, taxes only apply to
users of the marine environment and/or of the watershed of the municipality of le Prêcheur. It enables
an effective reduction of marine and land pressures on the marine ecosystems of le Prêcheur. The
second case extends the taxation regime to the users of the whole regional area. It calls for
empowerment and awareness of environmental issues by all users on the island.
Using these criteria, 24 taxes, royalties and entry fees have been devised (Table 2). A part of
these taxes seems a priori seldom enforceable in the case of the RNR of le Prêcheur (boxes
highlighted in blue in Table 2). The decision to exclude these taxes a priori derives from the
combination assessment of: social acceptability of the tax, legislative difficulties in the
implementation of this tax, injustice or equity problems created by the tax, etc. For example, a new
tax on polluting activities in Martinique that have impacts on marine ecosystems only to finance the
reserve of le Prêcheur would result in a significant opposition from businesses located far from the
northwest of Martinique and having no apparent negative impact on the area.
Ten other taxes seem more feasible and are worthy of a further analysis on their feasibility
(boxes highlighted in green in Table 2 above). The strengths and weaknesses of the implementation
of these taxes are presented in table 3 below.
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Table 2.Taxes as partial financing of the future RNR of le Prêcheur.
Introduction of a new tax or
royalty
Assignment of an
existing tax
Broadening of the rate
of an existing tax
Regional scale
Residential
tourists
Tax to finance regional
reserves of Martinique (on the
template of the tourist tax)
Share of the tourist tax of
the municipalities of
Martinique
Broadening of the
airport tax; broadening
of the transportation tax
Inhabitants of
Martinique
Tax to finance regional
reserves of Martinique (on the
template of the housing tax)
Share of dock dues
Broadening of the
airport tax; broadening
of the transportation tax
Marine
ecosystem
users
Tax on uses of the
ecosystems of Martinique
(in addition to fishing
licences for e.g.), tax on
offshore recreational
practices (surf, kitesurf, etc.)
Share of revenue of
fishing licences
Broadening of fishing
licences
Corporations
that pollute
Taxes on polluting activities
in Martinique that have
impacts on marine
ecosystems (urbanisation
coastal fringe, granulate
extraction, non-biological
agricultural activities, etc.)
Share of the tax on
marine polluting
activities
Broadening of the tax
on polluting activities
Local scale
(area of the
reserve and
surrounding
area)
Residential
tourists
Tax to finance the RNR of
le Prêcheur enforceable to
tourist operators of the
municipality (on the
template of the tourist tax)
Share of the tourist tax of
the municipality of le
Prêcheur
Broadening of the
transportation tax
Inhabitants of
Martinique
Tax to finance the RNR of
le Prêcheur enforceable to
the inhabitants of the
municipality (on the
template of the housing tax)
Share of the housing tax
of the municipality of le
Prêcheur
Broadening of the
transportation tax
Marine
ecosystems
users
Local tax on extracting
and/or damaging of the
RNR activities (fishing,
spearfishing); royalty on
diving activities; royalty on
taxi-boats, recreational boats
and private sailing boats
n.a. n.a.
Corporations
that pollute
Tax on polluting activities
of the watershed
n.a. n.a.
Note: n.a. = not applicable; Source: authors own creation.
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Table 3. Strengths and weaknesses relating to feasibility of implementation.
Strengths Weaknesses
Introduction of a new tax/royalty
Tax for the financing of the
RNR of le Prêcheur
enforceable to tourist
operators of the municipality
Tourism figures increasing, potential source
of growing incomes
Potential modulation of the rate based on
the environmental impact of the operator
Penalises supply of tourism services of the
municipality of le Prêcheur only, already
seldom developed
Potentially penalises visitors that are non-
users of marine ecosystems (e.g. Hikers)
Tax for the financing of the
RNR of le Prêcheur
enforceable to inhabitants
of the municipality
Empowers inhabitants on the impact of their
everyday practices on the ecosystem
Potential modulation of the rate based on
the environmental impact of the building
Penalises the inhabitants of the municipality
of le Prêcheur only, potentially making the
area less attractive
Potentially penalises the inhabitants that are
non-users of marine ecosystems (e.g. Hikers)
Local tax on extractive
and/or damaging of the
RNR activities (fishing,
spearfishing)
Reduces through a fiscal leverage the
extractive activities and other damaging
practices while producing revenues for the
reserve
Enables guidance by incentives for
reorientation of fishermen or discontinuing
of damaging practices (frequent use of
beach-seine for example)
Low acceptability upon populations of
fishermen and underwater hunters already
affected by management actions
Difficult to weigh the burden of a tax only on
fishermen and underwater hunters
Revenues of this tax are destined to decrease,
thus jeopardizing the financing
Penalises operators who take measures
voluntarily (eco-responsible construction,
choice of a fishing net with larger mesh, etc.)
Tax on polluting activities
of the watershed
Polluter-payer principle: polluting activities
must be subjected to financial compensation;
to go further, it is possible to implement a
payment for ecosystem services: polluting
activities fund the reserve for improvement of
the treatment of waste produce by these
activities; enables to give a tax preference to
non-polluting local activities (idea of a partial
exemption from tax for the reduction
of pollutants)
Seldom educational, as it can be interpreted
as a “right to pollute”
Concerning the development of the tourism
sector, operators are already subject to
obligation to avoid, reduce and compensate
damages to the environment
Royalty on diving activities Positive image from alerted and sensitized
persons, usually willing to pay extra if their
participation in the reserve is transparent
Widely favourable view of diving operators in
the area, willing to raise the average
price per dive
Cannot be the only measure because: i) little
profitable and ii) it shows a taxation disparity
of one activity without taxing the others
(fishing, swimming on beaches, access, etc.)
Royalty on taxi-boats,
recreational and private
sailing boats
Taxation affects primary beneficiaries of the
reserve (through tourism increase), the
acceptability of such a tax should be good
Can be done through various taxes and lead to
development (tax for the access to mooring
buoys in the reserve)
Cannot be the only measure because: i) little
profitable and ii) it shows a taxation disparity
of one activity without taxing the others
(fishing, swimming on beaches, access, etc.)
Continued on next page
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Strengths Weaknesses
Assignment of an existing tax
Share of the tourist tax of the
municipality of le Prêcheur
Tourism in the area is closely related to
visitation of natural resources, particularly
marine resources
Figures of tourism increasing, potential source
of growing incomes
Highlight the willingness of local authorities
to participate in the implementing of
the reserve
Opportunity for neighbouring municipalities
(Saint-Pierre, Grand Rivière, Cabaret, etc.) to
devote part of their tourist tax to the reserve
Little profitable as long as visitation and
supply of accommodation are limited
in capacity
Difficult to arbitrate for the reallocation of a
share of the tax to the reserve
Participation of neighbouring municipalities
to the reserve presumably difficult
Share of dock dues Taxation of all products sold in French
overseas – modulation of the rate based on
environmental impact of products
Difficult to justify the financing when dock
dues ought to help in economic
development
Advocacy work needed for an arbitration in
favour of the reserve and at the expense of
the financing item which loses the income
of the tax
Share of the tax on marine
polluting activities
Polluter-payer principle extended to the
region: polluting activities must be subject to
financial compensation
Gives a fiscal preference to non-polluting
regional activities (idea of a partial tax
exemption for reduction of pollutants)
Lack of acceptability of activities not directly
linked with le Prêcheur (e.g. Intensive
agriculture of southernMartinique)
Broadening of the rate of an existing tax
Broadening of the airport tax Can generate very high revenues at a low cost
per person
Attachment to marine ecosystems of airport
passengers, tourists or inhabitants
Airport taxes usually intended to upgrade
safety and comfort of passengers; can pose
problems of arbitration of tax revenues thus
needs an expansion and not a modification
of assignment
Broadening of the
transportation tax
The possibility of a justification of an
environmental approach of transport helps
social acceptance of the broadening of the tax
Political and legislative difficulties of
broadening the rate of an existing tax
Source: authors own creation.
3.2. Comparative analysis of the implementation feasibility
To compare them, the ten selected options are quantitatively analysed through these six criteria:
a. Ease of implementation: this criterion depends on the conditions of establishment of the tax, from the
easiest (broadening the tax base or the rate of an existing tax for the management of future MPA of le
Prêcheur) to the most constraining (introducing a new tax, the proceeds of which will be donated to the
managing organization for the management of future MPA of le Prêcheur);
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b. Acceptability: this criterion reflects the reaction of users and non-users to the implementation of the tax.
It is strongly related to the legibility of the tax objective. It also calls for a higher level in
communication and information which should accompany the implementation of the tax (the lower the
acceptability, the more communication activities must be well crafted, targeted);
c. Income generation: this criterion expresses the potential of the tax to generate revenues for the RNR;
depending on the choice of tax base and subject population; the wider the base and population, the
higher the contribution of the tax to partial financing of the RNR;
d. Sustainability: this criterion evaluates the life expectancy of the considered tax; taxes may be transient
or permanent, depending especially on their purpose, for instance a tax on destructive fishing practices
aims at eliminating these practices on the medium-term and not to sustain them in order to continue
taxing these activities;
e. Resilience to the economic context: this criterion foresees the consequences of the risks related to
economic uncertainties on the collection of tax revenues and provides better transparency on the
stability of the RNR’s financing;
f. Selectivity of the subjects: this criterion reflects the number and diversity of people subject to tax; the
considered tax should not, as far as possible, be restricted to a single occupational category, or there
will be poor social acceptability and economic risk.
The taxes considered for having a good potential to complete the financing of the future RNR of
le Prêcheur are qualitatively analysed according to these six criteria. The results are displayed in
Table 4 below: one star means “little” or “low”; two stars mean “a lot” or “strong”. Red means
“negative” and the blue “positive”.
3.3. Which option(s) to consider?
From the elements of the previous analysis, it is possible to rank the ten selected options. By
assigning a score by ranking the criteria of the comparative analysis of Table 4 (+1 for a blue star
and −1 for a red star), the feasibility of each option is relatively estimated (see Table 5).
The overall feasibility valuation shows a definite relevance to weigh the burden of taxation on local
leisure activities, through the establishment of a new royalty. The two options that cumulate the most
points are the royalty on recreational and sailing activities (8 points) and the royalty on diving activities
(7 points). Besides the financial contribution to the management of RNR of le Prêcheur, these options
also have the virtue of offering a tool to regulate the use of marine ecosystems. In this respect, they
function as an entrance fee (Voltaire et al., 2011). With the difference that they are better accepted in
France, the principle of the entrance fee faces legal (see right of the public domain) and social (tradition
of free access to nature) constraints (Vourc'h and Natali, 2000). However, possible difficulties of
introducing a new royalty in the currently depressed economic environment must be noted.
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Table 4. Comparative analysis of tax options for partial financing of the RNR of le Prêcheur.
Ease of
implementation
Acceptability Income
generation
Sustainability Resilience to
the economic
context
Selectivity
of the
subjects
Introduction of a new tax/royalty
Tax for the financing
of the RNR of le
Prêcheur enforceable
to tourist operators of
the municipality
Tax for the financing
of the RNR of le
Prêcheur enforceable
to inhabitants of the
municipality
Local tax on
extractive and/or
damaging of the RNR
activities (fishing,
spearfishing)
Tax on polluting
activities of the
watershed
Royalty on diving
activities
Royalty on taxi-boats,
recreational and
private sailing boats
Assignment of an existing tax
Share of dock dues
Share of the tourist
tax of the
municipality of le
Prêcheur
Share of the tax on
marine polluting
activities
Broadening of the rate of an existing tax
Broadening of the
airport tax
Broadening of the
transportation tax
Source: authors own creation.
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Table 5. Overall valuation of the feasibility of the ten considered taxes.
General valuation
Introduction of a new tax/royalty
Tax for the financing of the RNR of le Prêcheur enforceable to tourist operators of the
municipality
0
Tax for the financing of the RNR of le Prêcheur enforceable to inhabitants of
the municipality
−1
Tax on extractive and/or damaging of the reserve activities (fishing, spearfishing) −3
Tax on polluting activities of the watershed 1
Royalty on diving activities 7
Royalty on taxi boats, recreational and private sailing boats 8
Assignment of an existing tax
Share of dock dues 2
Share of the tourist tax 6
Share of the tax on polluting activities 2
Broadening of the rate of an existing tax
Broadening of the airport tax 7
Broadening of the transportation tax 2
Source: authors own creation.
The expansion of the airport tax seems to also be an interesting option (7 points). Its
implementation can be difficult because it is a broadening of the tax that does not directly benefit to
the management of the airport. But the revenue generated can be very large in view of visitation of
the airport Aimé Césaire.
The allocation of part of the tourist tax levied on all hosts of Martinique also proves relevant,
with a score of 6 points. This option provides a better distribution of the tax burden than a strictly
local royalty, which could penalize the attractiveness of the municipality of le Prêcheur.
Less interesting are the options that suggest the introduction of a tax on polluting activities of
the watershed and at regional scale, to allocate part of the dock dues or to expand the transportation
tax (1 or 2 points). The introduction of a tax on extractive activities in the area, or taxes to explicitly
finance the RNR with tourists or inhabitants of the municipality, prove to be among the least
favourable of the selected options. Yet these low scores, with regard to the complementary revenue
generation target for the RNR, should not mask the advantage in terms of management of marine
ecosystems and associated activities of the latter options. Thus, a tax on polluting or damaging
activities reduces pressures on ecosystems of the reserve and encourage virtuous practices for the
environment (Binet et al., 2013; Failler et al., 2015).
3.4. What incomes to expect?
With approximately 18,000 dives per year for around fifteen dive centres in the area of le Prêcheur
(Failler et al., 2010), the implementation of a royalty could generate between 36,000 and 90,000 euros
per year. For reference, an investigation undertaken with the visitors of Martinique had shown the
possibility to increase prices of 2 to 5 euros per dive as long as spectacular fish or marine areas can be
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observed, for a dive of an average price of 40 euros (Borot Battisti et al., 2011). This range is equivalent
to the introduction of a tax with a rate between 5 and 12.5%.
The implementation of an enlargement of the airport tax of 1 euro to finance regional marine
reserves would allow, with a passenger flow of 1.6 million on average for the last three years,
generation of an income of 1.6 million euros.
With a yearly average of 1500 excursionists visiting the area of le Prêcheur by taxi-boat or
sailing boat, the introduction of a royalty on tours could yield about 3,000 euros a year (for a
willingness to pay estimated at €2 per tour). This relatively low estimate does not take into account,
for a lack of assessment of their number, visitors on boats in the area. This is a potentially significant
income, as they are estimated at about 40,000 a year on all of Martinique.
With 19,000 residential tourists each year in the territory of the municipality of le Prêcheur,
the allocation of part of the tourist tax levied on all hosts of the municipality would generate an
income of 3,800 euros per year for €0.20 and €7600 per year for €0.40. The neighbouring
municipalities (Saint-Pierre, Grand Rivière, le Carbet, etc.) may also earmark a share of their
tourist tax to fund the reserve. This solidarity contribution of neighbouring municipalities could
generate tens of thousands of euros.
4. Payments for environmental services
The implementation of an MPA results in a decrease in fishing activities, little or not
compensated (Binet et al., 2013). To maintain their activity, fishermen tend to increase fishing
efforts in the unprotected territory, which goes against the MPA’s conservation efforts. It is therefore
essential to find a way to compensate for this loss of territory without increasing fishing efforts. In
addition, the ousting of the fishermen for the MPA results in a loss of knowledge for society in
general, as fishermen have empirical knowledge of the marine ecosystem transmitted in an ancestral
way. This knowledge is crucial to anticipate the consequences of global change on marine and
coastal ecosystems of the Caribbean islands. The traditional knowledge of the fishermen can also be
harnessed for the maintenance or improvement of coastal environments. This can be done
simultaneously to fishing activities. The point is not to convert fishermen to conservationists; no, it is
much more about involving them in the process of habitat conservation and sustainable use of
fisheries resources. Thus the two functions, fishing and protection, become inseparable.
The goal is therefore to develop a simple mechanism where fishermen can be rewarded for their
efforts towards the improvement of ecosystem services of marine protected areas. This realization
warrants a reflection on “payments for environmental services” or PES. The PES concept emerged in the
1990s (Meral, 2010), notably with the establishment of the PES program in Costa Rica that protects to
this day 25,000 hectares of forest. But it was not until 2002 that the PES experienced a real increase of
interest thanks to two books published by Landell-Mills and Porras, and Pagiola, Bishop and Landell-
Mills. Although the definition of PES is still controversial, the one established by Wunder (2005) is
widely accepted. It defines a PSE as a voluntary transaction where a particular ecosystem service is
‘purchased’ by (at least) one individual consumer from (at least) one individual supplier, if and only if the
supplier guarantees the production of this service. Designed in a market-driven, voluntary exchanges
between providers and consumers of services can thus be subject to negotiations, nonetheless forcing
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suppliers to engage in activities of specific use and to consider the demand to set the price. Moreover, the
compensation is carried out in a ‘logic of additionality’, as the presence of service must provide a benefit
to biodiversity, and in a ‘logic of conditionality’ ensuring the effectiveness of the service, its supply
becoming mandatory to obtain the payment (Froger et al., 2012).
Several PES programs similar to that of Costa Rica have been implemented, including in
Mexico (protection of about 2 million hectares of forest). However, the vast majority of PES
initiatives are implemented on a smaller scale. Thus, many PES program projects are being
implemented or prepared at national scale or the scale of a watershed (Pagiola, 2008). As of today,
no PES program has been established for marine and coastal ecosystems. The establishment of PES
in le Prêcheur would be a pioneering action that may, if successful, be replicated in other MPAs.
Behind the name of PES stands a simple mechanism that is to reward the actions of those that
enhance (or do not cause a decrease in) the quality of ecosystem services; the contributors being the
users. In other words, the fishermen can be paid for efficient actions in favour of biodiversity and for
the knowledge they provide to the governance of MPAs. In the first case, it is the direct users (divers,
boaters, hikers, swimmers, etc.) that will contribute to the remuneration of the actions of fishermen, in
the second, it is the society in general that is indebted (through the MPA) as protected areas act as
places with higher resistance to global change than non-protected areas, and with greater resilience.
The PES mechanism is all the more relevant as it generates funding for activities towards biodiversity
that would not exist otherwise. It is also sustainable because it is based on self-interest of fishermen
and users and not on the good will of the government or non-governmental organizations. It is all the
more sustainable as it has a net positive toll for both individuals and society as a whole.
A survey was conducted among the fishermen of le Prêcheur in 2015 and 2016 (Thirot et al., 2017).
The study sample, composed of 16 fishermen, represents about 50% of the fishermen declared in activity.
It is characterized by an ethnic diversity, ensuring a wide spectrum of responses and access to the various
existing categories in the professional group7. The fishermen's knowledge on the marine environment
originates from a daily presence at sea and the data transmission by peers during the apprenticeship. They
are presented very synthetically in Table 6 below. They can be promoted in the context of ecotourism,
where it is direct users who contribute to the payment of fishermen’s actions, or in scientific monitoring
and more generally theMPAmanagement.
7 However, some fishermen fiercely opposed to the creation of the MPA refused to be interviewed.
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Table 6. Knowledge of fishermen and their appreciation.
Knowledge of fishermen Ecotourism Scientific monitoring and
MPA management
Physical characteristics, behaviour and habits (feeding,
habitat, spawning grounds) of fish (ethology)
X X
Spawning grounds X
Fish life cycles (breeding and migration seasons) X
Impact of abiotic factors (hydraulic, oceanographic, climatic)
on fish life cycle
X
Adaptive and resiliency capabilities of the marine
environment to climate change
X
Endangered species X X
Health status of the marine environment (coral bleaching or
algal invasion for example)
X
Evolution of the fishery resource with notably species
rotation, disappearance or appearance (lion fish), etc.
X
Rhythm, temporality et cycle of fishing seasons and species
presence
X
Interconnections between species (between fish species but
also between fish and plants)
X
Impact of human activities on the marine environment X
Source: authors own creation.
The knowledge of fishermen encompasses both elements of local (nursery places for example)
and global (including climate change) knowledge, observed on a long timescale since some have
been working for over 30 years. With this sharp empirical knowledge, they are able to interpret
ecological processes at work in the marine environment by making hypotheses they can later test in
situ. This exercise is essential for those who wish to appreciate the evolution of the marine
environment, its adaptability and resilience to climate change. This integrated vision of the marine
ecosystem can thus be useful to the scientific monitoring and generally the management of the MPA
of le Prêcheur and for any type of action beneficial to the restoration, maintenance and improvement
of biodiversity in general (through awareness-raising of the educational world).
Although the MPA of le Prêcheur was formally created by deliberation of the Regional Council
of Martinique on October 14, 2014, no management structure exists at this time to make it run. The
PES therefore cannot be implemented. However, when an effective management is established, their
implementation should allow fishermen to contribute to the preservation of a common asset. Thus,
PES can act as catalysts and promote the MPA as means to add value to the fishing profession.
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5. Conclusion
The feasibility analysis of taxation as an additional income for the RNR of le Prêcheur
demonstrates the relevance of the enlargement of the airport tax to finance the RNR. This analysis
also demonstrates the benefits of the introduction of a new royalty on tourism activities related to the
enjoyment of the marine ecosystems of the area: the recreation and sailing on the one hand and on
the other hand diving. The allocation of part of the tourist tax, collected for the benefit of the
management of RNRs of Martinique, also appears an attractive option.
The estimation of the financial benefits of the four selected taxes is approximately €1.6 to 1.7
million. This income will probably be destined to increase for taxes levied locally with the establishment
of the RNR, the label of which will function as a guarantee of quality and therefore of attractivity to
visitors. For regional taxes on the other hand (primarily the airport tax), this participation will be reduced
with the possible creation of other regional marine reserves in Martinique.
However, the final selection of the preferred option requires a thorough operational analysis,
including in particular the implementation schedule, costs and results associated with the collection of
taxes and forecasted financials. In particular, the reality of the institutional context, fiscally constrained,
forces to reckon with limited resources and no guarantee of sustainability. It requires in all cases to fully
optimize the effectiveness and efficiency of resource use. For this, a detailed analysis of the starting funds
needed for the future reserve and then for the medium-term management seems essential, in parallel of
the study of potential sources. Finally, we must remember that, regardless of the option selected, no
action can succeed without first involving all stakeholders for concertation.
Finally, the implementation of a sustainable management of marine resources requires the
development of specific systems of gratification, such as payments for environmental services,
ensuring the recognition and enhancement of knowledge and actors who hold them, here the
fishermen. These compensation mechanisms need to take into account two types of environmental
services provided by fishermen. The first is based on the commitment to protect the marine
environment and requires a change in practices. The direct beneficiary is biodiversity. The second
service is to exploit the knowledge held by engaging in sustainable resource management operations,
in the short and medium term. The beneficiary is the society (more generally humanity) and
specifically the services recipients that are institutional players, other sea users and the local
population. In all cases, these bonuses must meet requirements of justice and fair redistribution.
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